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Empty Laws Make for Empty Stomachs: Hollow Public 
Housing Laws in Utah and Other States Force the 
Nation’s Poor to Choose Between Adequate Housing and 
Life’s Other Necessities 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 8, the projects, vouchers, rental assistance, affordable 
housing, the tax credit, low-income housing and moderate-income 
housing are all words or terms used to describe forms of public housing. 
Public housing programs are designed to provide housing or housing 
assistance to persons and families with very low to moderate income, to 
elderly persons, and to persons with disabilities.1 Public housing units 
range anywhere from high-rise apartments to single family houses. The 
United States has roughly 1.3 million households living in public 
housing units.2 These public housing units are managed by about 3,300 
Housing Authorities.3 These Housing Authorities are able to fund public 
housing through aid received from the federal government. With these 
federal funds, and private funds contributed through various housing 
programs, Housing Authorities generally subsidize rent payments by 
distributing funds to either landlords or tenants of these housing units, 
according to plans whereby the tenants pay no more than 30 percent of 
their adjusted annual income for housing.4
While federal law encourages states to address the need for public 
housing, states, in turn, may require as much from their municipalities.5 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (“the Housing Act”), the federal government 
 1. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development [hereinafter HUD], 
HUD’s Public Housing Program, http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
Some of these terms, particularly lower-income and public housing, are used interchangeably 
throughout this article. 
 2. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) estimates 
that there are an additional 2.7 million renter households who receive housing assistance. See JOINT 
CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY [hereinafter JCHS], THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2006 29 (2006), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2006/ 
son2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). In addition to rental assistance programs, HUD has a number 
of programs to assist qualifying families in purchasing and owning their own homes. For a complete 
list of HUD’s housing assistance programs, see HUD, Homes and Communities, http://www.hud. 
gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 3. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 29. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000); U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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uses its authority, based on the general welfare rationale, to legislate on 
local housing matters, an area traditionally left to states’ police power.6 
The purpose of this article is to describe the nation’s need for public 
housing and demonstrate that, aside from California and Massachusetts 
whose laws provide a concrete framework whereby developers or cities 
desiring to build public housing may do so, state laws are insufficient at 
making certain that public housing is actually erected unless the city and 
the developer both share a goal to do so. Part II gives a brief background 
of how the United States’ rapid development was a substantial factor in 
the need to create the very first public housing laws and that rapid 
development continues to press lawmakers to address housing issues. 
Part III discusses government programs that provide funds for the 
erection or redevelopment of public housing, including the HOPE VI and 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit programs that encourage private parties 
to work with government agencies to help with such funding. Part IV 
discusses various techniques that can be employed by the government to 
encourage the construction of public housing. Part V discusses how a 
few specific state and municipal laws affect the actual development of 
lower-income housing, including how state laws in both California and 
Massachusetts have the highest likelihood of actually affecting the 
erection of public housing by providing a framework under which the 
development of affordable housing is not only more worthwhile and 
plausible, but more lucrative and beneficial. Part VI demonstrates how 
municipalities implement state requirements though a discussion of 
Utah’s state and municipal housing codes. Utah’s laws are particularly 
telling because even though some municipalities in Utah actually claim 
to have no shortage of public housing, statistical studies show that many 
residents lack adequate housing and could benefit drastically from more 
specific state housing laws. Finally, Part VII gives a brief evaluation of 
how and whether state and municipal laws affect the development of 
public housing. 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437; see also Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365, 387 (1926) (All local zoning ordinances “must find their justification in some aspect of the 
police power, asserted for the public welfare.”). Though the federal government cannot require states 
to enact specific housing ordinances, it is the policy of the federal government “to promote the 
general welfare of the Nation by employing the funds and credit of the Nation . . . [and] to assist 
States and political subdivisions of States to address the shortage of housing affordable to low-
income families.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1). Thus, because the federal government has the authority to 
utilize the nation’s funds to encourage the development of lower-income housing, by implication, it 
may withhold the nation’s funds to those states and political subdivisions of states who do not 
address the shortage of affordable housing. So while the federal government does not necessarily 
have the “authority” to legislate on local housing matters, it has such authority to legislate on general 
welfare matters, and correspondingly encourage local legislation on housing matters through either 
disbursing or withholding federal funds. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
The rapid development of the United States has always been a 
contributing factor to the need for public housing. Public housing 
policies in the United States can, for the most part, be traced back to the 
rapid expansion of the late 19th century.7 In a nation fast developing, due 
in large part to transient immigrants working to improve their social 
status in an era of economic uncertainty, the government passed 
aggressive anti-vagrancy laws to curtail some of the increasing social 
difficulties related to the nation’s rapid growth.8 One such law went so 
far as to make homelessness a crime punishable by incarceration.9 In 
response to such far-reaching laws, trade unions and other workers 
lobbied local governments to build some of the nation’s earliest public 
housing.10
A few decades later, the Great Depression created new and more 
severe problems with homelessness and again evoked a governmental 
response, which became the backdrop for today’s public housing 
policies.11 As “massive layoffs were swiftly followed by widespread 
evictions,” unemployed councils emerged and advocated not only 
improved social and economic conditions, but cooperation between 
social groups and political powers to strike at the core of housing 
problems.12 When the Depression made it difficult for vagrant workers 
and entire families alike to find suitable housing, President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s “New Deal” allowed Congress to pass a series of acts aimed 
at alleviating such difficulties. One such Act was the Housing Act of 
1937, which was designed in part to aid low-income families in their 
search for suitable housing.13 Seventy years later, the Housing Act is still 
part of the United States Code.14 This law continues to have as one of its 
stated goals, the assistance of “[s]tates and political subdivisions of 
[s]tates to address the shortage of housing affordable to low-income 
 7. See Maria Foscarinis et al., The Human Right to Housing: Making the Case in U.S. 
Advocacy, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97, 112 (2004). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. (citing DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS 
IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 87-89 (1993)). 
 11. See generally HARRELL R. RODERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, (JAI 
Press 1984). 
 12. See Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 112. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000). 
 14. Id. 
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families.”15
More recently, another area of rapid development has had a huge 
affect on the need to address public housing in the United States: the 
housing market. With housing costs booming and household incomes on 
the decline, it is as difficult or more difficult today for a low- to 
moderate-income family to purchase a house than ever before.16 While 
“the generally accepted definition of affordability is for a household to 
pay no more than thirty percent of its annual income on housing,”17 
thirty-three percent of all American households spend more than thirty 
percent of their annual income on housing18 and ninety-five percent of 
homeowners with yearly incomes less than $20,000 have to exceed the 
thirty percent benchmark.19 With shortages of affordable housing, these 
families may be left to choose between paying rent and paying for other 
necessities such as “food, clothing, transportation and medical care.”20 
So how do these persons afford housing without sacrificing other 
necessities of life? Realistically, many do not. Although the American 
dream of home ownership is at an all-time high in the United States,21 
this dream is often intertwined with sleepless nights brought about 
because many homeowners sacrifice life’s other necessities to achieve 
it.22 While some persons and families decide to sacrifice food, insurance, 
housing location, and other wants or needs in order to live this American 
dream, others turn to public housing. 
Currently, individuals and families qualify for public housing if they 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (a)(1)(b) (2000). 
 16. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Housing Costs Taking Bigger Bite, DESERET MORNING NEWS 
(Salt Lake City), Oct. 3, 2006, at A02 (asserting that it is much more difficult now for buyers to get 
into the housing market because median home values have gone up thirty-two percent over the last 
five years while household income has declined 2.8% in that same time period). 
 17. HUD, Affordable Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/index.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 18. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 25. 
 19. See Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, Traffic, Housing Costs Force Commuters to Alter 
Routine, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at A4, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/ 
2006-10-02-commuter-routine_x.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
 20. HUD, supra note 17 (“Families who pay more than 30 percent of their income for 
housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty affording necessities such as food, 
clothing, transportation and medical care.”); see also JCHS, supra note 2, at 26. 
 21. Noelle Knox, Fewer families can afford a home, USA Today, March 21, 2006, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2006-03-21-families-real-estate-usat_x.htm 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (“Nearly 70% of Americans own their homes, a record high, but the rate 
of homeownership for working families with children is lower than in 1978.”). 
 22. See HUD, supra note 17 (“An estimated 12 million renter and homeowner households 
now pay more than 50 percent of their annual incomes for housing . . . . The lack of affordable 
housing is a significant hardship for low-income households preventing them from meeting their 
other basic needs, such as nutrition and healthcare, or saving for their future and that of their 
families.”). 
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have very low- or low-income.23 HUD defines very low-income 
individuals and families as those who earn less than fifty percent of the 
median income in the area in which they live and low-income individuals 
and families as those who earn fifty to eighty percent of the median 
income in their area.24 However, just because a family qualifies for 
public housing doesn’t necessarily mean they will receive assistance. 
Though there are roughly 16 million very low-income households who 
rent housing in the United States, only about 4 million of these 
households receive housing assistance.25 With the rapid rise in the real 
estate market and lack of a corresponding rise in income,26 many 
individuals and families simply close their eyes to the American dream 
of purchasing and owning their own home and turn to local, state, and 
federal governments for assistance in finding suitable housing. Some 
scholars believe that without financial support from the government, “it 
might well be that decent housing is simply beyond the reach of the 
poor.”27 Thus, the increase in home prices creates the motivation for 
local governments to provide housing assistance so people can meet even 
their most basic need of shelter. Accordingly, states and municipalities 
attempt to introduce ways to provide public housing for those low- to 
moderate-income individuals and families who have been priced out of 
suitable housing and who qualify for housing assistance, but are still 
denied adequate housing not simply because federal funding is 
unavailable,28 but because there are not enough affordable housing units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23. See HUD, HUD’s Public Housing Program, http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 29 (“HUD estimates that over four million renter households 
with incomes less than half of area medians now receive housing assistance, but this number 
represents only about a quarter of renters with incomes that low.”). 
 26. See Ohlemacher, supra note 16, at A02. 
 27. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 449 (6th ed. 2006). 
 28. Though insufficient funding is an obstacle to providing public housing, the limited scope 
of this article does not cover these funding concerns in depth. 
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III. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS COORDINATE HOUSING FUNDS 
 
A variety of government-sponsored programs assist lower-income 
persons and families in finding adequate housing. Although there are 
literally dozens of programs,29 only those most often employed are 
discussed here in detail. 
 
A. Section 8 
 
Section 8, which gets its name and authority from Section 8 of the 
United States Housing Act of 1937,30 is a project-based program that 
currently assists more than 1.3 million persons in obtaining suitable 
housing.31 Under Section 8, the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (“HUD”) contracts with owners of multi-family 
housing developments to provide housing to very low- to low-income 
individuals and families.32 Typically, these very low- to low-income 
individuals and families pay the highest of either thirty percent of their 
adjusted income, ten percent of their gross income, or the allotted 
amount of their welfare payments to the housing owners, and the federal 
government makes up the difference for whatever the fair market value 
of the unit may be.33
B.  Vouchers 
 
Two types of vouchers, also known as Certificates, currently serve as 
 29. See generally HUD, PROGRAMS OF HUD (2005), http://www.huduser.org/whatsnew/ 
ProgramsHUD05.pdf (providing a comprehensive overview of all HUD’s major programs). 
 30. See id. at 74 (“Legal Authority: Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 
1437(f).”). 
 31. See id. at 72. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See HUD’s Public Housing Program, http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last 
visited on Mar. 5, 2007) (“The Total Tenant Payment (TTP) in this program, would be based on your 
family’s anticipated gross annual income less deductions, if any. HUD regulations allow HAs to 
exclude from annual income the following allowances: $480 for each dependent; $400 for any 
elderly family, or a person with a disability; and some medical deductions for families headed by an 
elderly person or a person with disabilities. Based on your application, the HA representative will 
determine if any of the allowable deductions should be subtracted from your annual income. Annual 
income is the anticipated total income from all sources received from the family head and spouse, 
and each additional member of the family 18 years of age or older. 
The formula used in determining the TTP is the highest of the following, rounded to the 
nearest dollar: 
(1) 30 percent of the monthly adjusted income. (Monthly Adjusted Income is annual 
income less deductions allowed by the regulations); 
(2) 10 percent of monthly income; 
(3) welfare rent, if applicable; or 
(4) a $25 minimum rent or higher amount (up to $50) set by an HA.”). 
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Section 8’s main programs for funding lower-income housing: project- 
and tenant-based vouchers.34 The federal government provides funding 
for vouchers to local Public Housing Authorities (“PHAs”). PHAs then 
distribute these funds in the form of vouchers to either landlords or 
tenants of lower-income housing.35 Project-based vouchers provide 
rental subsidies for lower-income persons and families “who live in 
specified housing developments or units,”36 while tenant-based vouchers 
provide similar subsidies while allowing the qualified individual or 
family to choose their housing from the private market.37 Vouchers can 
also come in the form of home-ownership voucher assistance and 
enhanced voucher assistance.38 Through home-ownership vouchers and 
enhanced vouchers respectively, PHAs distribute vouchers to help with 
monthly expenses incurred by first-time homeowners and families who 
have been adversely affected by a HUD housing decision, such as a 
decision to terminate a project-based voucher for the housing project in 
which the family lived.39
While vouchers have served as the main avenue for funding public 
housing, federal funding for public housing has dropped dramatically 
over the last thirty years.40 With the drop in federal financing, the federal 
government has initiated programs aimed at encouraging private 
individuals and organizations (profit and not-for profit) to invest in 
developing lower-income housing. The most significant such programs 
today are HOPE VI and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.41
 
 34. See id. at 73–77. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See HUD, supra note 29, at 76. 
 37. See id. at 73–75. (At least seventy-five percent of funds granted to Public Housing 
Authorities for vouchers must go to families with incomes less than thirty percent of the area median 
income. Up to twenty percent of these funds may be distributed through project-based vouchers.) 
 38. See id. at 74. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 103 (citing CUSHING DOLBEARE & SHEILA CROWLEY, 
NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, CHANGING PRIORITIES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE 1976-2007 (2002), http://www.nlihc.org/doc/changingpriorities.pdf) 
(“Between 1976 and 2002 budget authority for federal housing assistance dropped by $28.1 billion. 
In January 1977 the Ford administration submitted to Congress a budget request for the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that would have funded 506,000 additional 
low-income housing units. Subsidized housing commitments dropped to 60,590 in 1982, to 33, 491 
in 1995, and to 8,493 in 1996.”). 
 41. See HUD, ABOUT HOPE VI, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ 
index.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (“The HOPE VI program serves a vital role in the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development’s efforts to transform Public Housing.”); HUD USER, Low-
Income Housing Tax Credits, http://www.huduser.org/datasets/lihtc.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2007) 
(“The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is the most important resource for creating 
affordable housing in the United States Today.”). 
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C.  HOPE VI 
 
HOPE VI is a program that encourages PHAs to form “partnerships 
with private entities to establish mixed-finance and mixed-income 
affordable housing.”42 In 1989, in response to the growth of ghettos 
caused by the grouping of lower-income housing developments together, 
Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed 
Public Housing (“the Commission”) and invited the Commission to 
develop a plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing by the year 
2000.43 Shortly thereafter, the Commission introduced the HOPE VI 
program. Under HOPE VI, the federal government gives grants to aid 
PHAs44 for a variety of projects aimed at renovating and rejuvenating 
downtown and main street areas of distressed cities.45 “The activities 
permitted under HOPE VI include, but are not limited to: the capital 
costs of demolition, major reconstruction, rehabilitation, and other 
physical improvements; the provision of replacement housing; 
management improvements; planning and technical assistance; and the 
provision of supportive services (including the funding, beginning in 
Fiscal Year 2000, of an endowment trust for supportive services).”46 
Since its inception, HOPE VI has been the source of over five billion 
dollars in grants.47 As of 2006, the HOPE VI program continues to play a 
“vital role” in transforming the image and placement of public housing 
from ghettos and slums to non-poverty neighborhoods and mixed-income 
communities.48
 42. HUD, supra note 29, at 80. 
 43. See id. 
 44. PHAs match at least five percent of funds given through such grants. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See HUD, Revitalization Grants, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/ 
grants/revitalization/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); HUD, HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANTS 16 
(2006), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/rev_grants_all.pdf. 
 48. HUD, About HOPE VI, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ 
index.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); see also HUD, BEAUMONT, TX FY 2006 HOPE VI 
REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 (2006), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/ 
grants/revitalization/06/beaumont.pdf (outlining the Beaumont, Texas Housing Authority’s HOPE 
VI grant and its uses); HUD, EASTON, PA FY 2006 HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 
(2006), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/easton.pdf 
(outlining the Easton, Pennsylvania Housing Authority’s HOPE VI grant and its uses); HUD, 
KINGSPORT, TN FY 2006 HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 (2006), 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/kingsport.pdf (outlining 
the Kingsport, Tennessee Housing Authority’s HOPE VI grant and its uses); HUD, NIAGARA FALLS, 
NY FY 2006 HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 (2006), http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/niagara.pdf (outlining the Niagara Falls, New 
York Housing Authority’s HOPE VI grant and its uses); HUD, BURRILLVILLE, RHODE ISLAND, 
MAIN STREET REDEVELOPMENT 1, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/ 
fy06/burrillville.pdf (describing the effects of a HOPE VI grant upon the Burrillville community); 
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D. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
 
The low-income housing tax credit (the “Tax Credit”) program was 
created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and stands today as the most 
important resource for providing lower-income housing in the United 
States.49 The Tax Credit program is a joint effort made by the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and state housing agencies to provide an 
incentive for taxpayers to invest in lower-income housing.50 The Tax 
Credit is a dollar for dollar credit that lowers a taxpayer’s federal income 
tax liability in exchange for a promise to provide lower-income housing 
for at least thirty years—fifteen under the jurisdiction of the IRS and 
fifteen under the jurisdiction of the state agency.51 The Tax Credit can be 
given to support the full range of lower-income housing projects and has 
been used to attract investments from banks, utility companies, and other 
corporate and individual investors as a means of fostering good 
community relations and “seek[ing] an attractive return on equity.”52 
Together with the HOPE VI program, the Tax Credit program has been 
effective in providing housing to the lower-income housing market53 in a 
way that the government can no longer afford to do on its own.54 As 
effective as these programs have been over the last twenty years, 
however, they simply have not been enough to provide housing for the 
majority of lower-income families who qualify for housing assistance.55 
This is evidenced by the fact that roughly seventy-five percent of very-
HUD, National Fact Sheet, Fiscal Year 2006 HOPE VI Revitalization Grant Awards, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/06nationalfactsheet.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (Municipalities and developers currently have plans to demolish 659 
severely distressed housing units and erect 799 new affordable housing units with 2006 HOPE VI 
funds.). 
 49. See HUD USER, supra note 41; Wayne H. Hykan, Pricing the Equity of a Tax Credit 
Project: An Institutional Investor’s Perspective, Handout distributed at the Real Property, Probate 
and Trust Law Section’s Fourth Annual Fall CLE Meeting held in Denver, Colorado (Oct. 2006) (on 
file with author). 
 50. See Internal Revenue Service, IRC § 42: the Low-Income Housing Credit in Summary, 
Low Income Housing Credit Newsletter Issue No. 22 (Sep. 2006). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. (“The credit supports a variety of housing opportunities. The taxpayer can build new 
housing, or acquire and rehabilitate existing housing. The housing can be apartments, single-family 
housing, single-occupancy rooms, or even transitional housing for the homeless. The property may 
be mixed affordable and market rate rental units or a portion of the property may be for commercial 
use.”); see also Hykan, supra note 49. 
 53. See HUD USER, supra note 41. 
 54. JCHS, supra note 2, at 29 (“Prospects for a turnaround are bleak. After nearly 20 years of 
increases, growth in federal housing assistance ground to a halt in the second half of the 1990s. The 
federal government, which has historically provided the lion’s share of subsidies, now faces a 
massive budget deficit and is looking for ways to fund the rising costs of international and domestic 
security.”). 
 55. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 29. 
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low income individuals and families do not receive any form of housing 
assistance.56
Although the Section 8, Vouchers, Tax Credit and HOPE VI 
programs have made important contributions to the lower-income 
housing market, unless more efforts are made by states, municipalities, 
and developers to bolster the market’s shortage of housing affordable to 
persons and families with low to moderate income, such shortage will 
remain and these persons and families will be left to choose between 
adequate housing and other necessities of life.57 The remainder of this 
article focuses on how housing laws enacted by states and municipalities 
affect the amount and location of available public housing units. 
 
IV.  THE EFFECT OF HOUSING LAWS ON THE ERECTION OF PUBLIC 
HOUSING 
 
A.  Authority to Create Housing Laws 
 
Most states have enacted housing laws that give their municipalities 
an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the development of 
affordable housing.58 This obligation includes the responsibility to 
“promulgat[e] appropriate land use ordinances under which a developer 
can be expected to construct” affordable housing.59 The obligation and 
authority to enact such land use ordinances at the federal and state levels 
derive from federal law60 and from state police power,61 respectively. 
With such obligation and authority, municipalities, under the direction of 
states, generally utilize one or more techniques to accomplish housing 
objectives ranging from combating discrimination effected by 
exclusionary zoning practices to affirmatively requiring the development 
of low- to moderate-income housing through inclusionary and incentive 
 56. See id. (“HUD estimates that over four million renter households with incomes less than 
half of area medians now receive housing assistance, but this number represents only about a quarter 
of renters with incomes that low. The low-income housing tax credit has helped to meet some of this 
shortfall by stimulating the production or rehabilitation of about 1.8 million affordable rentals since 
1987. But even the scale of this program has not been enough to keep the affordable rental inventory 
from shrinking.”). 
 57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 58. See 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 78 (2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000); see also Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 
Stat. 81 (1968) (exemplifying how the federal government can exercise the authority to enact laws 
for the general welfare of its citizens). 
 61. DAVID A. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 537 (4th ed. 2004) 
(“[A] municipality exercises the state’s police power, not its own”); see also Euclid v. Amber Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (All local zoning ordinances “must find their justification in some 
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”). 
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zoning.62
 
B.  Exclusionary and Inclusionary Zoning. 
 
1. Exclusionary zoning 
 
Exclusionary zoning is land use planning that has as its purpose, 
result, or effect “a form of economic segregation by restricting land 
usage . . . to block, or at least limit, the influx . . . of persons having low 
or moderate incomes” into a community or municipality.63 Often this 
entails blocking or limiting the influx of racial minorities, as “issues of 
racial segregation are not always completely separable from those of 
economic segregation, particularly when it is taken into account that a 
very large percentage of lower income families are members of racial 
minorities.”64 Exclusionary zoning generally occurs when a municipality 
enacts an ordinance that either sets a minimum lot or house size, which 
increases the cost of housing, or restricts or prohibits the erection of 
multi-family housing or manufactured homes.65 Courts have recognized 
the danger of this type of discrimination since the introduction of land 
use controls,66 but have not completely eliminated exclusionary zoning 
because many exclusionary techniques can be justified by an appeal to 
public health, safety, morals, welfare, or even aesthetic considerations,67 
which theories, coincidentally, are loosely related to the rationale under 
which the federal government justifies its legislation on public housing 
matters.68
In addition to these exclusionary justifications, two other notable 
obstacles make challenging exclusionary zoning difficult. First, the 
 62. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 61, at 548–49. 
 63. J. R. Kempler, Annotation, Exclusionary Zoning, 48 A.L.R.3D 1210 § 1[a] (1973). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 61, at 535–36. 
 66. See id. at 534 (citing Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 316 
(D.C.Ohio 1924) rev’d 272 U.S. 365 (1926)) (municipal ordinance was invalidated in part because it 
segregated the population according to income or status); see also Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 
6 S.E.2d 867, 870 (N.C. 1940) (“We are presently concerned . . . with municipal restrictions upon 
the use and occupancy of property as affected solely by the racial status of the proposed occupant.”) 
 67. See Kempler, supra note 63, § 1[b]; see also Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401, 407 
(N.J. 1955) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)) (“The concept of the public welfare 
is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into 
account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District 
of Columbia decide that the Nation’s capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing 
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437. 
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requirement that plaintiffs have standing often bars litigation brought by 
anyone not holding a legal or equitable interest in property that is 
adversely affected by the ordinance.69 Second, legislative deference, 
creates a presumption that the ordinance is valid and constitutional and 
will be upheld as such unless a challenging party satisfies a very high 
burden of proof.70
In spite of these obstacles, plaintiffs have successfully challenged 
zoning ordinances as exclusionary on numerous occasions. The most 
notable challenges are Mount Laurel I71 and Mount Laurel II,72 which 
together established the “fair share” doctrine, under which not only is 
exclusionary zoning prohibited, but municipalities must demonstrate that 
they provide their fair share of the necessary low- to moderate-income 
housing in the area.73 The Mount Laurel cases rejected “an ordinance 
permitting only single-family detached dwellings” and restricting 
“minimum lot area, lot frontage and building size requirements so as to 
preclude single-family housing” for moderate and lower-income families 
because it was contrary to the general welfare.74
In Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court established “the 
doctrine requiring that municipalities’ land use regulations provide a 
realistic opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing.”75 After 
eight years of virtual non-compliance with the Mount Laurel I decision, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited Mount Laurel in an attempt to 
“put some steel into” its earlier holding.76 In Mt. Laurel II, the court 
 69. See Kempler, supra note 63, § 2. 
 70. See id.; Kaahumanu v. County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts 
determine whether an action is legislative by considering four factors: (1) whether the act involves 
ad hoc decision making, or the formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few 
individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is formally legislative in character; and (4) 
whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. The act is generally considered legislative 
if it formulates policy, applies to the public at large, is formally legislative, and bears hallmarks of 
traditional legislation. (citing Bechard v. Rappold, 287 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir.2002)). 
 71. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975) (Holding that “a developing municipality may not, by a system of land use regulation, 
make it physically and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the 
municipality for various categories of persons who need and want it.”).
 72. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 
(N.J. 1983) (Holding that municipalities have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for 
housing, not simply for the opportunity to litigate for public housing.). 
 73. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724. 
 74. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713; Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390. 
 75. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 409–10. 
 76. Id. at 410 (“The Mount Laurel case itself threatens to become infamous. After all this 
time, ten years after the trial court’s initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel 
remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by 
hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel’s determination to 
exclude the poor. . . . 
To the best of our ability, we shall not allow it to continue. This Court is more firmly committed to 
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noted that not a single lower-income housing unit had been built since its 
earlier decision.77 In response to such inaction, the court established, in 
explicit detail and by way of a 120-page opinion, what New Jersey 
municipalities must do to fulfill their responsibility of providing a 
realistic opportunity for building low-income housing.78 The decision not 
only gave trial courts the authority to revise a municipality’s zoning 
ordinance upon the determination that the municipality had not fulfilled 
its regional fair-share obligation, but also the authority to require 
affirmative planning and zoning devices such as lower-income density 
bonuses and mandatory set-asides.79 Thus, not only had legislative 
deference been overcome in the courts, but courts (in New Jersey) could 
now exercise authority over legislation to require it to abide by judicial 
standards.80 Only a handful of states, however, have followed New 
Jersey’s aggressive jurisprudence.81
In response to the Mt. Laurel II decision, the New Jersey Legislature 
implemented the Mt. Laurel doctrine by enacting the Fair Housing Act 
and establishing the Council on Affordable Housing.82 Other states soon 
followed, enacting statutes requiring municipalities to provide their fair-
the original Mount Laurel doctrine than ever, and we are determined, within appropriate judicial 
bounds, to make it work. The obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not 
litigation. We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used, 
Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals. We 
intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify it, and make it easier for public officials, including 
judges, to apply it. 
This case . . . involve[s] questions arising from the Mount Laurel doctrine . . . [and] 
demonstrate[s] the need to put some steel into that doctrine. . . . The waste of judicial energy 
involved at every level is substantial and is matched only by the often needless expenditure of 
talent on the part of lawyers and experts.”). 
 77. See 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79D.07[3][b], 79D–367 
(Michael Allen Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 2000) (citing Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 461) (“Nothing 
has really changed since the date of our first opinion, either in Mount Laurel or in its land use 
regulations. The record indicates that the Township continues to thrive with added industry, some 
new businesses, and continued growth of middle, upper middle, and upper income housing. As far as 
lower income housing is concerned, from the date of that opinion to today (as far as the record 
before us shows) no one has yet constructed one unit of lower income housing—nor has anyone 
even tried to. Mount Laurel’s lower income housing effort has been either a total failure or a total 
success—depending on its intention.” (citations omitted)). 
 78. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390. 
 79. See id. at 445. 
 80. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390. 
 81. See, e.g., Britton v. Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (N.H. 1991) (court found ordinance 
restricting development of multi-family housing invalid and unconstitutional because it ran afoul of 
the statutory requirement that ordinances promote general welfare of community); Save a Valuable 
Env’t v. Bothell, 576 P.2d 401, 405 (Wash. 1978) (court found action of city in rezoning parcel from 
farmland to permit construction of shopping center arbitrary and capricious because the city failed to 
serve the welfare of community as a whole); Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 
468 (Pa. 1975) (court found zoning ordinance which provided for apartment construction in only 80 
of the 11,589 acres in township was unconstitutionally exclusionary). 
 82. See Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West 1985). 
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share of lower-income housing.83 Included in many of these ordinances 
were some of the affirmative devices suggested by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel II, such as lower-income density bonuses 
and mandatory set-asides.84 These affirmative zoning devices, which are 
calculated to encourage and often require a municipality to provide for 
its fair-share of lower-income housing, are commonly referred to as 
“inclusionary zoning.”85
 
2. Inclusionary zoning 
 
Inclusionary zoning can generally be broken down into two types: 
incentive zoning, under which municipalities offer one or more 
incentives to entice developers to erect lower-income units within or very 
near to the municipalities, and mandatory set-asides, also known by the 
generic title “inclusionary zoning,” under which developers must set 
aside a number of lower-income housing units in order to develop within 
a municipality.86
a.  Incentive zoning.  Incentive zoning generally takes the form of 
“the relaxation of certain restrictions in a zoning ordinance in return for 
the provision by a developer of a specified amount of lower-income 
housing units.”87 An example of such zoning would be when a specific 
area of the municipality is zoned to have a maximum density of ten 
multi-family housing units per acre. Without incentive zoning, a 
developer would be able to develop one hundred such units within a ten-
acre area. Under incentive zoning, however, a municipality relaxes the 
maximum density to allow a developer to erect one-hundred twenty-five 
units, provided that twenty of those units are set aside as lower-income 
housing units.88 Under this example, the developer has the option of 
building the additional 20 lower-income units, along with five bonus 
market-rate units, whereas under mandatory inclusionary zoning, 
discussed shortly, the developer must construct the lower-income units in 
order to erect any units in the municipality. 
The theory behind incentive zoning is that allowing a developer to 
erect additional market-rate units will compensate him for the erection of 
lower-income units.89 The key issue here is striking the balance between 
 83. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes and citations. 
 84. See id. 
 85. 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, §§ 
22.22–22.23 (4th ed. West 2006). 
 86. See Id. 
 87. Id. at § 22.22. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
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offering too little incentive to developers, who then refuse to develop 
lower-income units, and offering too much incentive to developers, 
whereby planning and zoning principles that have been established for 
the health, safety, and general welfare of the people are violated for the 
sake of providing affordable housing for a minority of the population.90 
While any exception to zoning criterion technically violates zoning 
principles that are calculated to best promote the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the community as a whole, smaller exceptions, while 
affecting zoning principles and the general welfare negatively to some 
extent, might have greater general welfare benefits that outweigh the 
resulting negatives.91 If municipalities over-incentivize, however, there is 
a decreasing marginal benefit gained by such a drastic increase of 
affordable housing and the resulting gains might not outweigh the 
negative effects to general welfare.92
Even though a developer may be able to construct more market-rate 
units, disincentives may dissuade him from doing so, especially in light 
of the fact that incentive zoning is voluntary. Clearly, when lower-
income housing units are erected, other market-rate units erected 
alongside such units will not be as enticing to non lower-income persons 
and families, making the value of the otherwise market-rate units fall 
below market rate. Though incentive zoning may be successful at 
erecting public housing if both municipality and developer share such a 
goal, if only one of the parties, usually the municipality, has the desire to 
erect lower-income housing, it is unlikely that such housing will be built. 
In fact, some scholars have deemed incentive zoning “totally 
unsuccessful” because developers will not leave their comfort zone (and 
likely their zone of expertise) of traditional development and take the 
risks that can be associated with an uncertain area of development.93 
Thus, municipalities seeking to develop lower-income housing without 
sacrificing more health, safety, or general welfare goals than necessary, 
 90. See id. at n.3 (California’s plan successfully combines regulatory and financial incentives 
by requiring “local governments [to] grant a twenty-five percent housing density bonus or similar 
incentive to developers of five or more units who set aside at least twenty-five percent of their units 
for low and moderate income persons.”). 
 91. Id. at §22:22. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. See also Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 445-46 (citing Fox & Davis, Density Bonus 
Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1060-62 
(1976)) (“Incentive zoning leaves a developer free to build only upper income housing if it so 
chooses. Fox and Davis, in their survey of municipalities using inclusionary devices, found that 
while developers sometimes profited through density bonuses, they were usually reluctant to 
cooperate with incentive zoning programs; and that therefore those municipalities that relied 
exclusively on such programs were not very successful in actually providing lower income 
housing.”). 
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can turn to firmer policies, commonly known as mandatory inclusionary 
zoning. 
b.  Mandatory inclusionary zoning.  Mandatory inclusionary zoning, 
which usually comes in the form of set-asides, requires developers to 
commit to constructing a certain number of lower-income units or 
otherwise providing for lower-income units in a municipality before they 
are able to develop in the municipality.94 Residential developers are 
generally required to set aside anywhere from ten to twenty-five percent 
of a development for lower-income housing.95 Commercial developers 
are often required to contribute to a lower-income housing fund that is 
used to develop lower-income housing units.96 As with incentive zoning, 
municipalities try to soften the blow to developers by providing some 
sort of compensation to assist in constructing these lower-income units. 
This compensation can come in numerous forms, including a waiver of 
fees (park, subdivision, processing, or other), exemption from utility 
connection charges, expedition of permit processing, waiver or relaxation 
of zoning requirements such as density, lot coverage, frontage, or height 
and setback requirements, or waiver of other zoning or subdivision laws 
or building codes.97 Additionally, developers may have alternatives to 
constructing lower-income units along with their market-rate units, such 
as erecting off-site lower-income housing, dedicating land for lower-
income units, or making cash payments that will ultimately be used to 
fund the construction of lower-income units.98 Finally, in some cases, a 
developer who has constructed more than the required lower-income 
units in the development may receive a lower-income unit credit, which 
may be applied to another development or sold or transferred to another 
developer to reduce the new development’s required number of lower-
income housing units.99
Two important issues arise under mandatory inclusionary zoning 
plans that do not arise under incentive programs: the denial of due 
process and the taking of private property without just compensation. 
When a governmental entity requires a private property owner to give up 
part of his or her land, the red flags of takings and due process are raised 
in a hurry. However, there are ways that municipalities can design 
zoning laws to avoid such claims. As with zoning ordinances that are 
 94. See ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 85, at § 22.23. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 284 (N.J. 1990). 
 97. ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 85, at §§ 22.22 n.2, 22.23. 
 98. See id. at § 22.23. 
 99. See id. 
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potentially exclusionary,100 those ordinances that may be challenged on 
takings or due process grounds will be given more deference in the 
courts when they qualify as legislative actions.101 Additionally, a 
municipality may avoid takings and due process issues if it carefully 
drafts its inclusionary zoning ordinance as a legislative action designed 
to accomplish legitimate state objectives through legitimate means.102
Courts are generally consistent in their treatment of due process and 
takings issues; a municipal ordinance will generally be upheld as not a 
taking and not a denial of due process when (1) the ordinance is 
established for a legitimate public purpose and is “a reasonable means to 
accomplish [such] purpose” and (2) the ordinance “advance[s] a 
legitimate state interest and the developer [is] not denied substantially all 
economically viable use of the property.”103 Applying this test to 
affordable housing, courts will generally deny due process and takings 
claims because the erection of affordable housing is usually seen as a 
legitimate state interest and because the required inclusion of affordable 
housing still allows a developer to profit from selling market-rate units 
and often times also from the affordable units.104 Most states follow this 
test when a land-use ordinance does not deprive a landowner of 
substantially all the value of his or her property,105 although there are 
some exceptions; for example, Oregon’s recently adopted Measure 37 
requires local governments to compensate landowners for any 
devaluation of the fair market value of the property through a land-use 
regulation.106
Another concern that arises under mandatory inclusionary zoning 
ordinances is whether such statutes are an effective solution to the long-
term problem of affordable housing. Some scholars argue, albeit without 
empirical data, that mandatory inclusionary zoning actually makes 
housing less affordable because it decreases the supply of new housing 
by turning away developers who do not want to develop lower-income 
housing units, correspondingly causing the demand and cost of existing 
 100. See supra Part IV(B)(1). 
 101. See Brian R. Lerman, Comment, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the 
Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (2006). 
 102. Id. at 394. 
 103. Id. at 394–95; see also, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(a court must evaluate a regulatory takings claim based on (1) the economic impact of the regulation, 
(2) the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the regulatory 
action). 
 104. See Lerman, supra note 101, at 394-95. 
 105. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 106. See STATE OF OREGON, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET: VOLUME 1-STATE MEASURES 103 (2004), 
available at http:// www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvol1.pdf (last visited 
December 30, 2006). 
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housing to rise.107 Such a system can cause a chain reaction. The 
municipality enacts a mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance and as a 
result, developers decide not to develop in the municipality because 
selling lower-income housing units is not as profitable as selling market-
rate units.108 Fewer new homes are built in the municipality, making the 
demand, and ultimately the price, on existing homes increase. Lower-
income persons and families are still unable to afford housing. 
Ultimately, moderate-income persons and families are priced-out of 
housing that would otherwise be affordable were it not for the heightened 
demand on current housing.109 Proponents of inclusionary zoning, 
however, argue that many housing markets already exclude low to 
moderate-income residents and that increasing housing costs brought 
about by existing exclusionary laws will make the situation worse unless 
inclusionary techniques are instituted.110 Though this argument also lacks 
supporting empirical data for its future projections, much of the 
argument is historical and contains statistics on the existing state of 
housing and the need to make improvements.111
Regardless of which argument a municipality agrees with it must 
take into account numerous factors when enacting its housing laws, 
including exclusionary and inclusionary zoning methods and their 
potential consequences. If the municipality believes that inclusionary 
zoning will be the best source for providing its fair share of lower-
income housing, it must decide between incentive and mandatory 
inclusionary zoning. The municipality must also ensure that the 
ordinance has and accomplishes a legitimate public purpose that does not 
take away all economically viable use of a property owner’s land so that 
the municipality avoids takings and due process challenges. Finally, a 
municipality must take into account the individual state law from which 
it derives its authority to zone so as to ensure that the ordinance attempts 
to fulfill a legitimate state purpose. 
 
 
V.  MOST STATE LAWS ENCOURAGE, BUT DO NOT REQUIRE, THEIR 
MUNICIPALITIES, TO ESTABLISH PLANS THAT REQUIRE LOWER-INCOME 
 107. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning 
Reclaimed”: How Effective are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 492 (2005) (“Cities 
should only enact inclusionary zoning if the goal is to make the vast majority of housing less 
affordable.”).
 108. See id. 
 109. For an in-depth critique of mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances, see id. 
 110. See Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating 
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 971 (Summer 2002). 
 111. For an in depth look at historical statistics supporting inclusionary zoning, see id. 
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DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Municipalities that are encouraged or required to develop housing 
laws must do so within the larger frame of their individual states’ laws. 
While municipalities in any of the states may adopt aggressive housing 
laws aimed at the construction of affordable housing, when state laws do 
not establish a framework that could supersede municipal decisions 
adverse to affordable housing, municipalities have little incentive to do 
so. Fifteen states encourage or require their municipalities to address the 
need for low-income housing generally,112 while a few other states’ 
housing laws are more specific and require, among other things, that 
each municipality create a “housing element . . . designed to achieve the 
goal of access to affordable housing to meet present and prospective 
housing needs, with particular attention to low and moderate income 
housing.”113 Such discussion of the housing element must usually 
include, among other things, an inventory of current lower-income 
housing, a projection of the stock of lower-income housing for the next 
few years, an analysis of the municipality’s demographics and probable 
future employment characteristics, a determination of the municipality’s 
fair share of lower-income housing along with its present and prospective 
housing needs, and “a consideration of the lands that are most 
appropriate for construction of [lower-income] housing, including a 
consideration of lands of developers who have expressed a commitment 
to provide [lower-income] housing.”114
Thus, of the states that do encourage or require municipalities to 
address the housing issue, most only request general attention. The 
remaining few require specific attention to current and future lower-
income housing needs in the context of the municipalities’ current and 
projected demographics. Though states may encourage or require 
municipalities to give either general or specific attention to the housing 
element, states do not generally require municipalities to enact 
inclusionary zoning plans or otherwise establish mechanisms, such as 
requiring sufficient incentives or an expedited permit process, to ensure 
that lower-income housing is actually developed and thus do not provide 
 112. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-106 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-23 (2006); 310 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/25 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5248 (2006); MD. CODE 
ANN. Art. 66B, § 3.05 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.859 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-27-8 
(2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2-6 (2005); S. C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-510 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 10-9a-403 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §4345a (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020 
(2006); WIS. STAT. § 66.1001 (2005); VA. CODE. ANN. § 15.2-2224 (2006). 
 113. N.J. ADMIN CODE § 5:92-1.4 (2006); see also CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65, 583 (1997); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 2656 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (2006).
 114. N.J. ADMIN CODE § 5:92-1.4. 
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the framework necessary to ensure that affordable housing is actually 
erected. 
Most states have specific reasons for requiring their municipalities to 
address lower-income or public housing.115 One scholar distinguishes the 
approach of western states with that of eastern states, stating that the 
western approach typically requires each state to address the need for 
affordable housing by zoning through a comprehensive plan, “requir[ing] 
more [than eastern states] from municipalities in their planning and 
zoning” so that the state can more “easily implement affordable housing 
requirements.”116 Eastern states, on the other hand, generally tailor their 
state plans either to eliminate specific exclusionary zoning practices or to 
construct lower-income housing developments.117 While requiring 
municipalities to create a strong plan can create clear direction for the 
future, it can also make adaptations to the plan more difficult. 
Additionally, while encouraging municipalities to tailor plans to specific 
exclusionary practices allows municipalities to maintain flexibility in 
developing applicable ordinances, the municipalities may not recognize 
the need to provide for lower-income housing. Regardless of how states 
decide to incorporate the housing element into their statutory law, 
whether it be to eliminate exclusionary zoning practices, to ensure that 
the people working in the municipality can live where they work, or to 
eliminate downtown blight and ghettos by dispersing the concentration 
of lower-income housing, municipalities must come up with a plan that 
addresses the need to provide affordable housing to individuals and 
families with lower incomes. 
Although state housing laws typically have similar goals concerning 
the development of lower-income housing—ensuring that municipalities 
address the current and future need for lower-income housing—the two 
most specific state laws, California’s and Massachusetts’, differ greatly 
on who, the municipality or the developer, has the power to ensure that 
lower-income housing is developed. California’s housing laws favor a 
very strong municipality, which leaves the door open for municipal plans 
whereby developers with plans to develop within a municipality have 
little to no say about whether they will develop lower-income housing.118 
Massachusetts’ housing laws favor a very strong developer, whereby the 
 115. See Lerman, supra note 101, at 399. 
 116. Id. at 404; see also infra Part V(A) (discussing how California’s plan requires strong 
municipal involvement in the planning and zoning of lower-income housing). 
 117. See id. at 399-404; see also infra Part V(B) (discussing how Massachusetts’ plan does not 
require strong municipal involvement in the planning and zoning of lower-income housing but 
instead allows the state to specifically override municipal plans that are not in the public’s best 
interest with regard to such housing). 
 118. See infra Part V(A). 
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municipality has little to no authority to limit the development of lower-
income housing.119 Typical state laws, however, do not demand a strong 
hand from either the municipality or the developer. Instead, most states’ 
laws simply encourage municipalities and developers to work together to 
develop an appropriate amount of lower-income housing, but do not 
require municipalities to establish any concrete mechanisms that will 
ensure the development of lower-income housing.120 Thus, while 
California gives municipalities the authority to require the development 
of public housing, and Massachusetts gives developers such power, the 
remaining states that actually address the housing element do not have 
stringent laws empowering either, and by default fall closer to the 
Massachusetts standard.121 In those states, if public housing is to be 
developed, developers must take the initiative because municipalities 
have little incentive to ensure the development of low-income housing 
once they have satisfied state requirements of addressing the lower-
income housing issue.122
 
A. Strong Municipal Plan: California 
 
California’s housing laws follow the typical pattern in that they 
require municipalities to include a housing element, one that addresses 
the current and future needs for affordable housing, as a part of their 
comprehensive zoning plans.123 In addition to the typical requirements, 
the state housing laws also encourage municipalities to be active and 
work aggressively with state and other local governments to accomplish 
affordable housing goals by requiring municipalities to follow numerous 
specific provisions designed to “facilitate and expedite the construction 
of affordable housing.”124 Heeding the state laws’ requirement to be 
 119. See infra Part V(B). 
 120. See infra Part V(C). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Though Massachusetts laws do not require developers to raise a strong hand in 
developing lower-income housing by threat of force, they go beyond the housing laws of the 
remaining states. As most states’ housing laws encourage developers to build lower-income housing 
and allow them an avenue to challenge a denial of a permit to build such housing through the court 
system, Massachusetts laws allow developers to avoid such costly challenges, which can generally 
be expected to deter a developer from his efforts, and go straight to a state sponsored housing 
committee that can override a municipality’s decision and grant the developer an instant right to 
develop lower-income housing. See infra Part V(B). 
 123. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65,583 (1997); see also Lerman, supra note 101, at 405-406. 
 124. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65,582.1 (1997) (“The Legislature finds and declares that it has 
provided reforms and incentives to facilitate and expedite the construction of affordable housing. 
Those reforms and incentives can be found in the following provisions: 
 
(a) Housing element law (Article 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580) of Chapter 3). 
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active and work aggressively to accomplish affordable housing goals, the 
city of Napa has enacted one of the strongest municipal plans in the 
United States with regard to accomplishing those housing goals.125
The City of Napa with its immense wine industry—an industry that 
relies on cheap labor—has no shortage of manual laborers. The city does, 
however, have a shortage of affordable housing for these manual 
laborers.126 Many laborers, as well as other lower-income individuals and 
families, are forced to either sacrifice other necessities of life such as 
food, clothing, and insurance, or move their families outside of the city 
towards more affordable housing. As these lower-income individuals and 
families move away from their jobs, they are forced to commute back 
into the city, contributing to other rapid-development related problems—
traffic and pollution.127 In an effort to address these problems, the city 
formed a housing task force comprised of representatives from non-profit 
agencies, environmental groups, religious institutions, local industries, 
for-profit developers, and the local chamber of commerce.128 This task 
force studied the local housing element, as required by state housing 
laws,129 and recommended that the City of Napa enact an inclusionary 
(b) Extension of statute of limitations in actions challenging the housing element and 
brought in support of affordable housing (subdivision (d) of Section 65009). 
(c) Restrictions on disapproval of housing developments (Section 65589.5). 
(d) Priority for affordable housing in the allocation of water and sewer hookups (Section 
65589.7). 
(e) Least cost zoning law (Section 65913.1). 
(f) Density bonus law (Section 65915). 
(g) Second dwelling units (Sections 65852.150 and 65852.2). 
(h) By-right housing, in which certain multifamily housing are designated a permitted use 
(Section 65589.4). 
(i) No-net-loss-in zoning density law limiting downzonings and density reductions 
(Section 65863). 
(j) Requiring persons who sue to halt affordable housing to pay attorney fees (Section 
65914) or post a bond (Section 529.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
(k) Reduced time for action on affordable housing applications under the approval of 
development permits process (Article 5 (commencing with Section 65950) of Chapter 
4.5). 
(l) Limiting moratoriums on multifamily housing (Section 65858). 
(m) Prohibiting discrimination against affordable housing (Section 65008). 
(n) California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 
12900) of Division 3). 
(o) Community redevelopment law (Part 1 (commencing with Section 33000) of Division 
24 of the Health and Safety Code, and in particular Sections 33334.2 and 33413).”). 
 125. See Lerman, supra note 101, at 399 (“Western states . . . have had more success in 
implementing inclusionary programs. The western states’ approaches, especially that of the City of 
Napa, illustrate the potential for inclusionary programs.” .”). 
 126. See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62 (Cal. App. 
1st Dist. 2001). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65,583 (1997). 
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housing ordinance modeled after the inclusionary ordinance already 
enacted by Napa County.130
The City of Napa enacted two inclusionary housing ordinances 
requiring all developers to dedicate ten percent of all new development, 
residential and commercial, for use as lower-income housing. An 
inclusionary zoning plan of this nature immediately raised obvious 
takings and due process issues.131 The Home Builders Association of 
Northern California filed a complaint against the City of Napa seeking to 
have the housing ordinances invalidated as a violation of takings and due 
process laws.132 The Home Builders Association appealed the district 
court’s demurrer of its complaint and again raised takings and due 
process arguments.133 In response to these arguments, the court held that 
although the ordinances imposed significant burdens on developers, they 
also provided significant benefits, including “eligib[ility] for expedited 
processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants, and density bonuses.”134 The 
challenges on takings and due process grounds were invalidated because 
Napa’s ordinance allowed developers to apply for and the city to grant 
waivers to the set-aside requirements.135 Because the City of Napa could 
waive the ten percent requirement upon the developer’s showing that 
such requirement is not justified, the housing ordinances were deemed 
valid.136
Thus, California’s housing laws allow municipalities to enact 
housing ordinances that require all developers to set aside a percentage 
of development or pay an in lieu fee for the development of lower-
income housing.137 These inclusionary zoning laws are not unlawful 
under the takings clause as long as the ordinance allows for the 
municipality to waive them when circumstances make them 
unnecessary.138 On paper, this appears to be the most effective state law 
for ensuring that lower-income housing is developed. As developers 
must develop to stay in business, and as those who develop within 
certain municipalities must erect lower-income housing, California’s 
housing laws do the most to ensure that lower-income housing is actually 
erected.139
 130. See Home Builders Ass’n, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. at 62–63. 
 135. See id. at 64. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Though critics of inclusionary zoning techniques argue that developers do not necessarily 
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B. Weak Municipal Plan (Strong Developer Plan): Massachusetts 
 
Massachusetts housing laws follow a different philosophy than 
California’s; they encourage developers to take the lead in creating 
public housing.140 Massachusetts encourages developers by providing an 
expedited application and development process for erecting lower-
income housing that allows developers to avoid lengthy and costly delays 
that typically accompany such processes.141 Massachusetts’ main housing 
law, the Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act (“Chapter 
40B”) was initially referred to as the Anti-Snob Zoning Act because of 
the Massachusetts Legislature’s original intent to combat the urban crisis 
and racial segregation (accompanied by a shortage of affordable housing 
for minorities in the inner city) that was exacerbated by the 1965 passage 
of the “Racial Imbalance Act”142 and other historical housing procedures 
tending to make lower-income housing development a difficult task.143 
have to develop within the municipalities that have inclusionary housing laws, see Benjamin Powell, 
supra note 107, if states enact more specific laws that require all of their municipalities to adopt 
inclusionary zoning provisions, developers will be forced to either develop under the rubric of 
inclusionary zoning or else relocate their operations in a way that would drastically affect business. 
Hence, though technically, developers do not have to develop within a particular municipality to stay 
in business, specific state laws can eliminate or lessen the likelihood that developers will simply alter 
their operations to avoid a municipality’s inclusionary techniques. 
 140. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1998) (Under §21 a developer can avoid 
lengthy and costly delays and offset the lower profit margin traditionally associated with developing 
lower-income housing with the benefits accompanying minimal administrative requirements 
required under expedited permit processing and the lessened possibility for permit denial or 
revocation). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts 
Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Legislative 
Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381, 385 (2001) (“The push for 
chapter 40B began in 1967 when a group of young, liberal legislators and housing activists skillfully 
seized upon the national ‘Do Something’ climate of opinion (regarding the urban crisis, racial 
segregation, shortage of decent housing, inner city decline and unrest) and capitalized on the 
political context in the Massachusetts legislature. The latter included overwhelmingly Democratic 
control, powerful House and Senate leadership positions held by urban-based politicians, and 
considerable ‘political baggage’ left over from the passage of the ‘Racial Imbalance Act’ in 1965. 
That controversial Act, which mandated the correction of racial imbalance in public schools, defined 
an ‘imbalanced’ school as one with more than 50% non-white enrollment; therefore, given racial 
residential patterns in metropolitan areas, it effectively applied only to urban school districts.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 143. Bd. of App. v. Hous. App. Comm. in Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs, 294 N.E.2d 393, 402-
04(Mass. 1973) (instead of requiring developers to apply for permits or variances through numerous 
departments or agencies who often stand as a barrier to development of lower-income housing, such 
as those governing “minimum lot size requirements, green space zoning, minimum frontage and 
setback requirements, minimum floor area requirements, maximum building areas of lots, building 
height limitations, inspection and permit fees”, the Act allows developers to apply to a single agency 
and avoid the time, monetary, and prejudicial drawbacks that accompany the traditional development 
process). 
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Under Chapter 40B, a developer desiring to construct lower-income 
housing need apply only to one local agency for the appropriate permit, 
which must either be granted or rejected within seventy days of the initial 
application.144 Permit applications that are not approved or that are 
conditionally approved can be immediately appealed to the Housing 
Appeals Committee, which has the authority to override any local agency 
decision that is not reasonable or “consistent with the needs of the 
community.”145 Out of 112 local agency decisions to deny or 
conditionally deny lower-income housing permit applications, 94 were 
overturned for not being consistent with the needs of the community 
while only 18 were upheld.146
In the late 1960s, the towns of Hanover and Concord, Massachusetts, 
were in need of lower-income housing for the elderly and for persons and 
families with lower incomes.147 When two developers submitted 
comprehensive permit applications to the Hanover and Concord Boards 
of Appeals, each developer’s application was rejected.148 Both 
developers immediately filed an appeal with the state Housing Appeals 
Committee.149 Both rejections were overturned and a comprehensive 
permit was granted in one instance and the Board of Appeals was 
ordered to grant a permit in the other without any further hearing.150 In 
both instances, the Housing Appeals Committee decided that the Boards 
of Appeals’ decisions were not consistent with the housing needs of the 
communities.151 When the Boards of Appeals sought review in the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, the court found that: 
 
 144. See id. at 386. 
 145. Id. at 386–87 (“The law also established standards for determining whether a ZBA denial 
is ‘consistent with local needs,’ and by so doing effectively set an affordable housing goal, or fair 
share quota or threshold, for all communities. Specifically, chapter 40B provides that developers are 
not entitled to a HAC appeal, and thus a ZBA decision will stand, if any one of the following 
conditions which define what “consistent with local needs” means, has been met by a community: 
(1) at least 10% of its total housing stock consists of subsidized housing for low- and moderate-
income households; (2) at least 1.5% of its land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use 
is used for such housing; or (3) a proposed development would result within one calendar year in the 
start of construction of low- and moderate-income housing on more than 0.3% of the town’s land 
zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use, or ten acres, whichever is larger. This provision 
was intended to give an incentive to communities to take the initiative to develop a ‘reasonable’ 
amount of subsidized housing, i.e., at least 10% of their total housing, in order to become immune to 
the appeal process.”). 
 146. See id. at 397–98. Five of the eighteen were upheld on technical grounds. Id. 
 147. Bd. of App. v. Hous. App. Comm. in Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs, 294 N.E.2d 393, 419-
23 (Mass. 1973). 
 148. See id. at 400. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 419–23. 
 151. Id. 
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the Legislature’s adoption of an administrative mechanism designed to 
supersede, when necessary, local restrictive requirements and 
regulations, including zoning by-laws and ordinances, in order to 
promote the construction of low and moderate income housing in cities 
and towns is a constitutionally valid exercise of the Legislature’s 
zoning power which was properly implemented in the proceedings 
before us.152
 
Thus, Massachusetts law allows for the State Housing Committee to 
override any local agency’s decision if it is not in accord with what the 
state has envisioned for the housing needs of its residents.153
In contrast with California’s laws that invite municipalities to take 
the leading role in developing lower-income housing, Massachusetts’ 
laws can eliminate the municipalities’ role completely if their decisions 
are not consistent with the lower-income housing needs of the 
community. Thus, Massachusetts developers are encouraged to and 
supported in taking the lead in the development of lower-income 
housing, while Massachusetts’ municipalities can be overruled if they do 
not share the state Housing Appeals Committee’s view of local 
community needs. 
 
C. Typical Municipal Plan: Illinois 
 
Illinois’ Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act is 
representative of many other state housing laws154 in that it requires 
municipalities to address the housing element, including an assessment 
of the current and future needs for lower-income housing.155 
Municipalities may satisfy this requirement by enacting a housing plan 
that consists of the following provisions: municipalities must set a goal 
of having at least fifteen percent of all new developments or 
redevelopments qualify as affordable housing, an overall three percent 
increase in affordable housing in the jurisdiction, or a minimum total of 
ten percent of all housing in the municipality qualified as affordable 
housing.156 The Act defines affordable housing as 
 
 152. Id. at 424 (emphasis added). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 155. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/25 (2005) (Under Illinois’ housing law, a state committee 
determines whether each municipality must conduct the assessment of public housing needs. 
Essentially, municipalities where less than ten percent of housing units are deemed “affordable” by 
the state agency must enact a housing plan.).
 156. See id. 
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housing that has a sales price or rental amount that is within the means 
of a household that may occupy moderate-income or low-income 
housing. In the case of dwelling units for sale, housing that is 
affordable means housing in which mortgage, amortization, taxes, 
insurance, and condominium or association fees, if any, constitute no 
more than 30% of the gross annual household income for a household 
of the size that may occupy the unit. In the case of dwelling units for 
rent, housing that is affordable means housing for which the rent and 
utilities constitute no more than 30% of the gross annual household 
income for a household of the size that may occupy the unit.157
 
The Act requires Illinois municipalities to create incentives for attracting 
the development of affordable housing in their jurisdiction in order to 
reach these affordable housing goals.158
Illinois’ law is typical in that it defines what a municipality must, 
may, or may not do,159 but does not establish a system that adequately 
encourages the development of lower-income housing.160 The Illinois 
Act mandates that municipalities establish lower-income housing plans, 
but does not have in place the mechanisms that will result in the actual 
construction of lower-income housing. Developers can appeal a local 
agency’s denial of a permit to develop lower-income housing to a state 
committee similar to the process in Massachusetts.161 Unlike 
Massachusetts, however, where the state committee can override a 
municipality’s decision simply if the municipality has not adequately 
addressed its lower-income housing needs, the Illinois state committee 
cannot supersede a municipality’s decision unless a developer can show 
that he or she was unfairly denied or that unreasonable conditions were 
placed upon the tentative approval of the development.162
This leaves Illinois, and most other states that merely require their 
municipalities to address the housing issue in general, in the exact place 
where Mt. Laurel I left New Jersey, without the necessary construction 
 157. Id. § 67/15. 
 158. See id. § 67/25. 
 159. Id. (A municipality must enact a plan stating the current needs of affordable housing, 
identifying prospective sites. A municipality may adopt certain measures such as a housing trust 
fund to help finance affordable housing activities. A municipality may not enter into an 
intergovernmental agreement with another municipality that has more than twenty-five percent 
affordable housing in an attempt to avoid development requirements under the Act.) .). 
 160. See Parts V (A) and (B), discussing California’s and Massachusetts’ housing laws, which 
adopt an expedited construction process for lower-income housing that goes beyond the discussion 
and calculation of the need for affordable housing and establishes an accelerated framework for the 
actual development of lower-income housing. 
 161. See id. § 67/30. 
 162. See id. 
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of lower-income housing unless a developer or municipality voluntarily 
ensures such housing is developed.163 Though a typical plan may be 
successful in that municipalities address the housing element in a way 
that allows developers to erect affordable housing, it does not create a 
specific framework expediting the process or otherwise providing 
sufficient incentives to ensure such development. In contrast to 
California’s state laws that require municipalities to adopt inclusionary 
zoning ordinances that expedite the development of affordable housing, 
and Massachusetts’ state laws that allow the state housing committee to 
supersede local municipalities if it decides that the municipality’s 
decisions are not consistent with its lower-income housing needs, most 
states’ laws that require municipalities to address the affordable housing 
issue do not establish the necessary framework to ensure that such 
housing is developed.164
 
VI. UTAH HOUSING LAWS ARE TYPICAL AND DO NOT REQUIRE 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING TO BE DEVELOPED 
 
Though Utah appears, at first glance, to be an exception from most 
states in that some of its municipalities calculate a surplus in affordable 
housing, the state is not an exception from the rest of the United States 
when it comes to residents actually living in public housing; many 
residents qualify for lower-income housing that is not readily 
available.165 Though incomes have increased by about five percent over 
the last three years, housing prices have increased twenty-five to thirty 
percent, leaving many residents unable to afford suitable housing.166 To 
 163. The first low-income housing actually developed under the Mt. Laurel doctrine was not 
approved until twenty-six years after the Mt. Laurel litigation began (1997), and the initial 140-unit 
townhouse development reached completion near the end of 2002, over thirty years after litigation 
began. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 61, at 550. 
 164. See supra Part V. 
 165. See NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 2005 1 (2005), 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2005/pdf/UT.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2006); GEOFF BUTLER, 
NEIGHBORHOOD LIFE CYCLE CASE STUDIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING 39 (2006), 
http://www.utahhousing.org/documents/NeighborhoodLifeCycle9-06__GeoffButler.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2006) (The necessity of lower-income housing in Utah is understated by local governments 
because new construction is out of the price range of lower-income persons and families. As existing 
affordable houses have a slow turnover rate, lower-income persons and families are prevented from 
occupying such affordable housing. “While many communities meet affordable housing targets 
through existing housing stock, this often is not affordability that can be easily tapped. Most HB295 
studies . . . tie most affordability to existing housing stock.”); see also, 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
67/20 (the state committee must take into account the total “number of for-sale housing units in each 
local government that are affordable to” lower-income households, not just the amount of existing 
units affordable to such households.”). 
 166. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., STATE 
OF UTAH CONSOLIDATED PLAN 2006-2010 19, http://community.utah.gov/housing_and_ 
  
495] HOLLOW PUBLIC HOUSING LAWS 523 
 
be able to afford the average two-bedroom apartment in Utah an 
individual would have to make $12.98 per hour and work forty hours per 
week without any vacation.167 A current minimum wage worker, 
someone who earns $5.15 per hour,168 would have to work 101 hours a 
week without vacation or else join 1.5 other people earning the same 
amount in order to afford the average two-bedroom apartment.169 The 
State of Utah calculates that 4,342 new affordable housing units have 
been needed each year for the last eight years, while only 2,621 units 
were actually developed per year.170 Of those 4,342 new affordable 
housing units needed each year, 625 are needed just for those families 
that earn less than thirty percent of the annual median income.171 Thus, 
many individuals and families in Utah must look to public housing to be 
able to afford rent without sacrificing other basic needs. 
 
A.  Utah State Housing Laws 
 
As is the case with many of the state laws already discussed, Utah 
law requires each municipality to have a comprehensive plan in place 
that addresses its present and future needs.172 In 1996, the Utah 
Legislature passed House Bill 295, which requires municipalities to 
address the housing element in their general plan.173 Municipalities adopt 
comprehensive plans upon recommendations made by their planning 
commissions.174 Under Utah law, it is the planning commission which 
must address the housing element in its recommendation to the 
municipality.175 The relevant portion of the Utah Code states the 
following: 
 
(2)(a) At a minimum, the proposed general plan, with the 
community_development/OWHLF/documents/ConsolidatedPlan2006-2010.doc (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006). 
 167. See NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, supra note 165, at 1 (“In Utah, the 
Fair Market Rent (FMR) for a two-bedroom apartment is $675. In order to afford this level of rent 
and utilities, without paying more than 30% of income on housing, a household must earn $2,249 
monthly or $26,989 annually.”). 
 168. Pending legislation contemplates an increase of minimum wage in the near future. As of 
March 26, 2007, however, Federal minimum wage is $5.15. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., supra 
note 166, at 8. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-401 (2005). 
 173. See BENJAMIN A. THOMSON, OREM DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
SUMMARY REPORT & PRELIMINARY PLAN OF ACTION, AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1998). 
 174. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-403 (2005). 
 175. See id. 
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accompanying maps, charts, and descriptive and explanatory matter, 
shall include the planning commission’s recommendations for the 
following plan elements . . . . 
(iii) for cities, an estimate of the need for the development of additional 
moderate income housing within the city, and a plan to provide a 
realistic opportunity to meet estimated needs for additional moderate 
income housing if long-term projections for land use and development 
occur. 
(b) In drafting the moderate income housing element, the planning 
commission: 
(i) shall consider the Legislature’s determination that cities should 
facilitate a reasonable opportunity for a variety of housing, including 
moderate income housing: 
(A) to meet the needs of people desiring to live there; and 
(B) to allow persons with moderate incomes to benefit from and fully 
participate in all aspects of neighborhood and community life; and 
(ii) may include an analysis of why the recommended means, 
techniques, or combination of means and techniques provide a realistic 
opportunity for the development of moderate income housing within 
the planning horizon, which means or techniques may include a 
recommendation to: 
(A) rezone for densities necessary to assure the production of moderate 
income housing; 
(B) facilitate the rehabilitation or expansion of infrastructure that will 
encourage the construction of moderate income housing; 
(C) encourage the rehabilitation of existing uninhabitable housing stock 
into moderate income housing; 
(D) consider general fund subsidies to waive construction related fees 
that are otherwise generally imposed by the city; 
(E) consider utilization of state or federal funds or tax incentives to 
promote the construction of moderate income housing; 
(F) consider utilization of programs offered by the Utah Housing 
Corporation within that agency’s funding capacity; and 
(G) consider utilization of affordable housing programs administered 
by the Department of Community and Culture.176
 
While the Utah Code describes its affordable housing stock as moderate-
income housing and not low-income housing, municipality moderate-
income housing standards are identical to HUD’s lower-income housing 
 176. UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-403 (2005). 
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standard, fifty to eighty percent of the median income in the area.177 
Further, the Utah Division of Housing and Community Development 
estimates that only seventy-five percent of Utah municipalities have thus 
complied with state requirements to develop an affordable housing 
plan.178 Thus, Utah, like Illinois and most other states, is not likely to 
have an increase in the amount of public housing unless developers are 
insistent upon erecting such housing to the point that they are willing to 
challenge municipal laws in court, and able to gain a victory, a feat not 
easily accomplished in most states.179 Additionally, though the majority 
of Utah’s municipalities have enacted ordinances that conform with state 
housing laws, a violation of such ordinances and or laws is not easily 
remedied by an expedited process but must be attacked through costly 
administrative and judicial proceedings, a fact that can discourage 
developers from leaving the comfort zone of traditional developing and 
branching out into the area of affordable housing.180
Compared with California’s laws giving municipalities the authority 
to require lower-income housing development, Massachusetts’ laws 
giving such power to developers, and Illinois’ laws and most other state 
laws somewhere in the middle, Utah shares most similarities with those 
states in the middle. Such state laws require their municipalities to 
address the housing element, but do not have in place aggressive laws to 
ensure that such housing will actually be developed.181 Utah also 
participates in the federal financing plans previously discussed, such as 
the HOPE and the Tax Credit Program, which, though successful, do not 
provide the necessary funds to house all of Utah’s lower-income 
population.182 Thus, it is left to municipalities and developers to work 
together if sufficient public or lower-income housing is to be 
constructed. 
 
B. Utah Municipality Laws: Provo 
 
The city of Provo’s general plan complies with the state law 
requirement to provide a moderate income housing plan and it contains 
an in-depth analysis of Provo’s current and future housing needs.183 
 177. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 1 (2003). 
 178. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., supra 
note 166, at 19. 
 179. See supra Part IV(B)(1). 
 180. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 3 (2003). 
 181. See supra Part V. 
 182. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., supra 
note 166, at 22. 
 183. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 (2003). 
  
526 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
Provo’s plan defines moderate income housing as “housing occupied or 
reserved for occupancy by households with a gross household income 
equal to or less than 80% of the median gross income of [the county].”184 
Based on the 2000 census, the average household size in the applicable 
area185 was rounded up to four persons, making the median household 
income $50,400, and 80% of that median income $40,300.186 Thus, 
households of four who earned less than $40,300 per year qualified for 
moderate income housing, which meant they could afford to purchase a 
house for $130,900 or less or to pay rent of $940 per month or less 
without going over the national recommended spending limit of thirty 
percent of household income for housing.187 With specific reference to 
the Utah Code, Provo’s plan contains an estimate of the existing supply 
of moderate-income housing, an estimate of the need for moderate-
income housing for the next five years, a survey of total residential 
zoning, an evaluation of how existing zoning densities affect 
opportunities for moderate-income housing, and a description of Provo’s 
program to encourage an adequate supply of moderate-income 
housing.188
Provo’s plan is quite different from those of other municipalities 
around the nation in that it is one of the few plans that actually calculates 
an overall surplus of lower-income housing.189
 
[D]ata shows that there are more housing units than households in the 
80% to 51% and the 50% to 31% income groups. There is a shortage of 
moderate-income housing in the 30% to 0% income group, but this is 
to be expected. It would be difficult to find a significant amount of 
housing for purchase lower than $42,700 or for rent at less than $280 a 
month.190
 184. Id. at 1. Although Provo’s plan describes moderate-income as fifty to eighty percent of 
the area’s median income, HUD defines this same income class as low-income. 
 185. See id. at 2. (This statistical data was based on the previous definition of moderate 
income housing, which included a comparison to other individuals and families living in the 
metropolitan statistical area rather than the county). 
 186. See id. at 1 (including numbers based on statistics from 2002). 
 187. See id. at 2. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 3 (2003). But see GEOFF BUTLER, supra note 165, at 
39 (The necessity of lower-income housing in Utah is understated by local governments). 
 190. Id. 
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Percentage 
of median 
income, 
actual 
income, 
and 
maximum 
rent 
affordable 
per month 
80 to 
51 
Percent 
Income 
of 
$37,20
0 and 
max 
rent of 
$860 
50 to 
31 
Percent 
Income 
of 
$23,25
0 and 
max 
rent of 
$510 
30 to 0 
Percent 
Income 
of 
$13,95
0 and 
max 
rent of 
$280 
 
 
Households 6,060 4,386 4,269 
 
Housing 
Units 
8,215 6,463 2,243 
 
Deficiency 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2,026 
(52.5%
) 
Although Provo’s plan is unique in that it does not calculate an overall 
need for more lower-income housing, it is similar to plans of other 
municipalities in that it does calculate a need for more lower-income 
housing for households in the lowest income bracket.191 Provo’s plan for 
addressing its lower-income housing needs is also unique in that its 
remedy for fulfilling the housing needs of its lower-income residents is 
not primarily focused on the construction of major developments but 
instead focuses on limited relaxations of zoning standards.192
Provo’s plan mainly advocates the relaxation of a limited number of 
zoning standards, and secondarily promotes various housing programs 
and incentives that are typical of municipalities around the nation.193 
Provo encourages usage of the Project Redevelopment Option, which 
allows new, one-family and multi-family lower-income housing to be 
built in residential and mixed-use settings. The plan also encourages 
accessory apartments, manufactured homes, and cluster development 
patterns, which patterns consist of efficiently clustering homes on 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. at 8–11. 
 193. See id. 
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smaller lots with smaller driveways so as to maximize land usage in an 
economy where land prices have jumped.194 The plan also calls for 
incentives and tax breaks for developers of lower-income elderly and 
special-needs housing.195 Finally, the plan encourages lower-income 
households to use various government programs that provide subsidies to 
assist those households in affording housing that is likely already on the 
market.196
Thus, although Provo’s general plan is unique in at least one 
aspect—the city does not calculate a pressing need for the development 
of lower-income housing—its operation under the umbrella of Utah state 
housing laws demonstrates that Utah’s state laws are typical of most 
other states in the union; they require their municipalities to address the 
housing element but do not have laws to ensure that such housing will 
actually be developed.197
 
 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is a wide-spread need for additional public housing throughout 
the United States. Federal and state governments have introduced and 
implemented numerous plans to aid in developing public or lower-
income housing. Though public housing issues are being widely 
addressed, few state laws or municipal plans put in the “steel” that the 
New Jersey’s Supreme Court envisioned in the Mt. Laurel II decision.198 
Most states and municipalities discuss the need for lower-income 
housing and encourage the use of incentives and programs, but do 
nothing in the way of actually requiring the development of lower-
income housing. A growing number of states require their municipalities 
to adopt incentive or inclusionary zoning techniques or plans, and two 
states in particular, Massachusetts and California, have aggressive plans 
in place to ensure that lower-income housing is erected by allowing 
developers an expedited process under which erecting affordable housing 
becomes or remains a viable option. Most other states, including Illinois 
and Utah, follow a pattern of requiring their municipalities to address the 
housing element. However, instead of establishing a framework under 
 194. See id. 
 195. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 9–11 (2003). 
 196. See id. at 11. 
 197. See id.; supra Part VI. 
 198. Id. 
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which municipalities or developers can ensure that development within a 
municipality will contain affordable housing, they sit back and wait for 
municipalities and developers to work together towards the actual 
development of lower-income housing. Thus, although there are 
numerous programs aimed at increasing the amount of public housing, 
and although states have the ability to establish laws requiring the 
development of lower-income housing, aside from two exceptions, 
California and Massachusetts, state and municipal laws do not have a 
major effect on the development of lower-income housing. 
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